BLYSTONE v. PENNSYLVANIA
110 S. Ct. 1078,108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 9
Fall 11-1-1990
BLYSTONE v. PENNSYLVANIA 110 S. Ct.
1078,108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
BLYSTONE v. PENNSYLVANIA 110 S. Ct. 1078,108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990), 3 Cap. Def. Dig. 9 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol3/iss1/9
Capital Defense Digest - Page 9
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Citing its decisions in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
(Holding that sentencing court's failure to consider the defendant's
turbulent family history as a mitigating factor was constitutional error),
and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (Holding that sentencer must
allow consideration of any aspect of the defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as
the basis for a sentence less than death), the Court stated that the eighth
amendment requires the sentencing decision to be based on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the defendant, his background, and his
crime. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990). The Court
also noted that Eddings established two objectives to be followed when
evaluating death penalty claims underthe eighth amendment: "measured
consistent application and fairness to the accused." Eddings, 455 U.S. at
110-111. The Court reasoned that careful appellate court weighing of
aggravating against mitigating circumstances wouldproduce therequired
consistent application of the death penalty. Such a weighing process
would also result in fairness to the accused, especially because state
supreme courts often review death sentences.
The Court remanded this case to the Mississippi Supreme Court
because the opinion below did not clearly state whether the court did in
fact perform a weighing function, and whether it claimed the power to
reweigh at the appellate level under state law. Under the Eddings and
Lockett decisions, an automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing state
would be invalid because itwould not give defendants the individualized
treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of
mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion stating that the
majority's speculation that the Mississippi Supreme Court could reweigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances andpossibly salvage Clemons'
death sentence amounted to an advisory opinion. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at
1455. He further reasoned that appellate court reweighing of a death
sentence that in part rests on a constitutionally impermissible factor
allows the reviewing court to assume the role of sentencer. Blackmun
concluded that appellate sentencing is improper because appellate
courts do not hear the trial testimony or observe the accused, and
therefore, appellate courts have diminished ability to act as factfinders.
As in Mississippi, the application of Virginia's vileness factor is
often unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (Holding that the jury's
discretion to impose the death penalty is unguided unless the trial court
communicates a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the meaning
of vileness factors); and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)
(Holding that the words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman," standing alone, fail to limit the jury's discretion).
Under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264AC an individual may
receive the death sentence if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
probability that: (1) the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
(future dangerousness); or (2) that the defendant's conduct in commit-
ting the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim" (vileness). Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C (Repl. Vol. 1990).
If both the future dangerousness and vileness factors originally are
found, and one aggravating circumstance later is found to be invalid or
unsupported by the evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court claims the
authority automatically to salvage the deathpenalty without any weighing
or harmless error analysis, and without considering mitigation evidence
at all. See case summary ofMu'min v. Commonwealth, CapitalDefense
Digest, this issue.
Virginia's capital scheme differs from that of Mississippi because
the Mississippi statutory scheme expressly calls for the weighing and
balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1989). Virginia Code Section 19.2-
264AC only requires the sentencer to consider mitigating evidence and
to find an aggravating factor to support a sentence of death. However, the
absence of a formal weighing process in the Virginia statutory scheme
is not dispositive because a Virginia jury has the option to sentence the
defendant to life even if both aggravating circumstances are present.
Thus, aweighingprocess arguably occurs becausethejury mustconsider
both aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate
sentence.
Virginia attorneys should also observe that the appellate findings
authorized in Clemons - balancing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and harmless error review - open to litigation the fact-
finding machinery of the Virginia Supreme Court when one of two
aggravating factors found at trial is invalidated. In summary, Clemons
does nothold, but strongly suggests, that Virginia's "automatic salvaging"
holdings are unconstitutional. If the Virginia Supreme Court abandons
a claim of authority to automatically salvage death sentences, the next
step for the defendant is to litigate the adequacy of the supreme court's
rules and procedure for fact finding.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas
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FACTS
During September 1983, Scott Wayne Blystone, accompanied by
his girlfriend and another couple, picked up a hitchhiker along a
Pennsylvania road. Blystone intended to rob the hitchhiker, Dayton
Charles Smithburger. Learning that Smithburger had very little money,
Blystone pulled off the road and searched him in a nearby field,
recovering only thirteen dollars. Blystone ordered Smithburger to lie
face down, and then he shot Smithburger six times in the back of the
head. During subsequent conversations, Blystone bragged in detail
about killing Smithburger.
The Court of Common Pleas convicted Blystone of first-degree
murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, and criminal
conspiracy to commit robbery. At the sentencing stage of the capital
trial, the Pennsylvania jury found that Blystone "committed a killing
while in the perpetration of a felony", one of the aggravating factors
under the Pennsylvania death penalty statute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9711(d)(6) (1988). The Pennsylvania death penalty statute mandates
death if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances, or if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (c) (1)(iv). Finding
no mitigating circumstances, the jury sentenced Blystone to death. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence.
The United States Supreme Courtgranted certiorari to determine whether
the mandatory aspects of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute un-
constitutionally limited the jury's discretion.
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HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania death penalty
statute satisfied the eighth amendment requirement that a capital sen-
tencing jury be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant
mitigating evidence as required by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1986)
(holding that the jury must be allowed to consider as mitigating evidence
any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any other circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death).
The Court specifically rejected Blystone's argument that the
mandatory aspect of the jury instructions prohibited the jury from
assessing whether the relative severity of the conduct that constituted the
aggravating factor warranted the death penalty. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the aggravating factors served to
narrow the class of death eligible defendants and that the eight amend-
ment requires no further refinement. He further justified this conclusion
by noting that the eighth amendment requirement of individualized
sentencing is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1087, 1083
(1990).
The Court also rejected Blystone's challenge that the statute
foreclosed the jury from considering some types of mitigating evidence,
particularly lesser degrees of statutory mitigating factors. The judge
gave the jury examples of some statutory mitigating circumstances it
could consider, including whether the petitioner was under "extreme"
emotional disturbance, "substantially" impaired in appreciation of his
conduct, or under "extreme" duress. The Court rejected the claim that
these instructions precluded the jury from considering lesser degrees of
disturbance, impairment or duress because the judge elsewhere ex-
plained and the statute provided that thejury could consider any relevant
mitigating evidence. Id. at 1084. Specifically, the judge explained to the
jury that these examples were merely items that could be considered and
that the jury was entitled to consider any other mitigating evidence.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania death penalty statute provided a catchall
mitigating factor which instructed the jury that it could consider "any
other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the
defendant and the circumstances of the offense." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9711 (e)(8).
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The United States Supreme Court has upheld mandatory aspects
of death penalty statutes. In Jurek v. Texas, the court upheld the Texas
sentencing scheme which required a sentence of death if certain findings
were made against the defendant beyond the initial murder conviction.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
the Texas sentencing scheme satisfactorily guided the jury's discretion
so as to cure the constitutional defect identified in Furman v. Georgia,
See Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(holding death penalty statutes unconstitutional because unguided juries
were applying the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner).
The Court rejected Blystone's argument that the jury instructions
precluded the jury from considering the severity of the aggravating
circumstances in determining whether the imposition of death was
warranted. It held that aggravating circumstances limit the class of
defendants eligible for death, and the eighth amendment does not
command that these circumstances be further refined. See Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (use of aggravating factors in the
definition of an offense is ameans of narrowing the class of death eligible
defendants). The Pennsylvania death penalty statute does not automati-
cally call for the death penalty for certain types of murders; rather, it
mandates a sentence of death when the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances in aparticularcrime.Blystone, 102
S. Ct. at 1082.
One could argue that the Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania
statute because the judge gave explicit instructions to the jury and made
extensive references to the catchall factor to inform the jury that it could
consider all mitigating circumstances. The Virginia death penalty stat-
ute contains many of the same mitigating factors as the Pennsylvania
statute. However, Virginia procedures do not necessarily insure that the
jury understands the meaning and scope of mitigation. The Virginia
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that the trial court
fails to give the jury any guidance about the nature and function of
mitigating circumstances. See O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 672,
701,364 S.E.2d 491 (1987).
In Virginia, there is very little explanation of mitigation. The
model jury instructions and the Virginia verdict form provide the jury
with minimal guidance regarding the meaning of mitigation. Further-
more, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that even though the Virginia
legislature permits the jury to grant a sentence of life when the jury finds
all aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, the jury
does not have to be explicitly informed about this alternative. Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978). These factors not
only fail to provide the Virginia jury with guidance about the meaning
of mitigation, but also have a tendency to mislead the jury about its
discretion to consider and give effect to any relevantmitigating evidence.
In Blystone, the judge gave the jury examples of mitigating
evidence. These included whether the defendant was under "extreme"
emotional disturbance, "substantially" impaired in appreciation of his
conduct, or under "extreme" duress. Even though the jury is also entitled
to consider lesser degrees of impairment, the Supreme Court did not
consider these examples misleading because the judge explicitly in-
structed the jury to consider any other mitigating evidence concerning
the defendant's character, or record and any other circumstance of the
offense. Virginia, however, fails to provide any instructions that inform
thejury that it may consider any othermitigating evidence the defendant
proffers at trial. In fact, the Virginia Supreme court has held that it is not
necessary that the statutory factors be communicated to the jury. Clark
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 S.E.2d 784,791 (1979).
Because the jury is entitled to consider and give effect to all
relevant mitigating evidence and because the Virginia jury instructions
and verdict form fail to provide guidance in consideration of mitigation,
counsel has the responsibility to inform the jury of its discretion in
considering mitigation. Closing arguments and proposed jury instruc-
tions are mechanisms counsel can use to inform the jury about its proper
role in the capital trial.
The failure to explain the meaning of mitigation to the jury takes
on new meaning in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Walton v.
Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (See case summary of Walton v. Ari-
zona, Capital Defense Digest, this issue). In Walton, the Court stated that
the jury must be informed about every aspect of the sentencing process.
Id. at 3057. Therefore, the jury may not be properly informed as required
under Walton if it does not understand the meaning and scope of
mitigation.
The Blystone holding may have further implications for capital
defense in Virginia. The Court stated thatthe eighth amendment does not
require that aggravating circumstances be further refined. If the state
legislature has not provided and the court will not allow comparative
severity to be weighed as an aggravating factor, relative lack of severity
should, and can, be introduced as a mitigating factor.Lockett specifically
authorized that circumstances of the offense may be introduced as
mitigating evidence. Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (1986).
In summary, there is a strong argument that the Pennsylvania
death penalty statute was upheld because of the instructions that explic-
itly informed the jury about the scope of mitigation. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court may not require that aggravating factors be further
refined; however, this does not prohibit counsel from introducing
relative lack of severity as a mitigating factor.
Summary and analysis by:
Steven K. Hemdon
